In 1898, Washington occupied the Philippines and in the years that
followed pacified its rebellious people, in part by fashioning the
world’s first full-scale “surveillance state” in a colonial land. The
illiberal lessons learned there then migrated homeward, providing the
basis for constructing America’s earliest internal security and
surveillance apparatus during World War I. A half-century later, as
protests mounted during the Vietnam War, the FBI, building on the
foundations of that old security structure, launched large-scale illegal
counterintelligence operations to harass antiwar activists, while
President Richard Nixon’s White House created its own surveillance
apparatus to target its domestic enemies.
In the aftermath of those wars, however, reformers pushed back
against secret surveillance. Republican privacy advocates abolished
much of President Woodrow Wilson’s security apparatus during the 1920s,
and Democratic liberals in Congress created the FISA courts in the 1970s
in an attempt to prevent any recurrence of President Nixon’s illegal
domestic wiretapping.
Today, as Washington withdraws troops from the Greater Middle East, a
sophisticated intelligence apparatus built for the pacification of
Afghanistan and Iraq has come home to help create a twenty-first century
surveillance state of unprecedented scope. But the past pattern that
once checked the rise of a U.S. surveillance state seems to be breaking
down. Despite talk about ending the war on terror one day, President
Obama has left the historic pattern of partisan reforms far behind. In
what has become a permanent state of “wartime” at home, the Obama
administration is building upon the surveillance systems created in the
Bush years to maintain U.S. global dominion in peace or war through a
strategic, ever-widening edge in information control. The White House
shows no sign — nor does Congress — of cutting back on construction of a
powerful, global Panopticon that can surveil domestic dissidents, track
terrorists, manipulate allied nations, monitor rival powers, counter
hostile cyber strikes, launch preemptive cyberattacks, and protect
domestic communications.
Writing for TomDispatch four years ago during Obama’s first months in office, I
suggested that
the War on Terror has “proven remarkably effective in building a
technological template that could be just a few tweaks away from
creating a domestic surveillance state — with omnipresent cameras, deep
data-mining, nano-second biometric identification, and drone aircraft
patrolling ‘the homeland.’”
That prediction has become our present reality — and with stunning
speed. Americans now live under the Argus-eyed gaze of a digital
surveillance state, while increasing numbers of surveillance drones fill
American skies. In addition, the NSA’s net now reaches far beyond our
borders, sweeping up the personal messages of many millions of people
worldwide and penetrating the confidential official communications of at
least 30 allied nations. The past has indeed proven prologue. The
future is now.
The Coming of the Information Revolution
The origins of this emerging global surveillance state date back over
a century to “America’s first information revolution” for the
management of textual, statistical, and analytical data — a set of
innovations whose synergy created the technological capacity for mass
surveillance.
Here’s a little litany of “progress” to ponder while on the road to today’s every-email-all-the-time version of surveillance.
Within just a few years, the union of Thomas A. Edison’s quadruplex
telegraph with Philo Remington’s commercial typewriter, both inventions
of 1874, allowed for the accurate transmission of textual data at the
unequalled speed of 40 words per minute across America and around the
world.
In the mid-1870s as well, librarian Melvil Dewey developed the “Dewey
decimal system” to catalog the Amherst College Library, thereby
inventing the “smart number” for the reliable encoding and rapid
retrieval of limitless information.
The year after engineer Herman Hollerith patented the punch card
(1889), the U.S. Census Bureau adopted his Electrical Tabulating machine
to count 62,622,250 Americans within weeks — a triumph that later led
to the founding of International Business Machines, better known by its
acronym IBM.
By 1900, all American cities were wired via the Gamewell
Corporation’s innovative telegraphic communications, with over 900
municipal police and fire systems sending 41 million messages in a
single year.
A Colonial Laboratory for the Surveillance State
On the eve of empire in 1898, however, the U.S. government was still
what scholar Stephen Skowronek has termed a “patchwork” state with a
near-zero capacity for domestic security. That, of course, left ample
room for the surveillance version of modernization, and it came with
surprising speed after Washington conquered and colonized the
Philippines.
Facing a decade of determined Filipino resistance, the U.S. Army
applied all those American information innovations — rapid telegraphy,
photographic files, alpha-numeric coding, and Gamewell police
communications — to the creation of a formidable, three-tier colonial
security apparatus including the Manila Police, the Philippines
Constabulary, and above all the Army’s Division of Military Information.
In early 1901, Captain Ralph Van Deman, later dubbed “the father of
U.S. Military Intelligence,” assumed command of this still embryonic
division, the Army’s first field intelligence unit in its 100-year
history. With a voracious appetite for raw data, Van Deman’s division
compiled phenomenally detailed information on thousands of Filipino
leaders, including their physical appearance, personal finances, landed
property, political loyalties, and kinship networks.
Starting in 1901, the first U.S. governor-general (and future
president) William Howard Taft drafted draconian sedition legislation
for the islands and established a 5,000-man strong Philippines
Constabulary. In the process, he created a colonial surveillance state
that ruled, in part, thanks to the agile control of information,
releasing damning data about enemies while suppressing scandals about
allies.
When the Associated Press’s Manila bureau chief reported critically
on these policies, Taft’s allies dug up dirt on this would-be critic and
dished it out to the New York press. On the other hand, the Division
of Military Information compiled a scandalous report about the rising
Filipino politician Manuel Quezon, alleging a premarital abortion by his
future first lady. Quezon, however, served the Constabulary as a spy,
so this document remained buried in U.S. files, assuring his unchecked
ascent to become the first president of the Philippines in 1935.
American Blueprint
During the U.S. conquest of the Philippines, Mark Twain wrote an
imagined history of twentieth-century America. In it, he predicted that
a “lust for conquest” had already destroyed “the Great [American]
Republic,” because “trampling upon the helpless abroad had taught her,
by a natural process, to endure with apathy the like at home.” Indeed,
just a decade after Twain wrote those prophetic words, colonial police
methods came home to serve as a template for the creation of an American
internal security apparatus in wartime.
After the U.S. entered World War I in 1917 without an intelligence
service of any sort, Colonel Van Deman brought his Philippine experience
to bear, creating the U.S. Army’s Military Intelligence Division (MID)
and so laying the institutional foundations for a future internal
security state.
In collaboration with the FBI, he also expanded the MID’s reach
through a civilian auxiliary organization, the American Protective
League, whose 350,000 citizen-operatives amassed more than a million
pages of surveillance reports on German-Americans in just 14 months,
arguably the world’s most intensive feat of domestic surveillance ever.
After the Armistice in 1918, Military Intelligence joined the FBI in
two years of violent repression of the American left marked by the
notorious Luster raids in New York City, J. Edgar Hoover’s “Palmer
Raids” in cities across the northeast and the suppression of union
strikes from New York City to Seattle.
When President Wilson left office in 1921, incoming Republican
privacy advocates condemned his internal security regime as intrusive
and abusive, forcing the Army and the FBI to cut their ties to patriotic
vigilantes. In 1924, Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone, worrying that
“a secret police may become a menace to free government,” announced
“the Bureau of Investigation is not concerned with political or other
opinions of individuals.” Epitomizing the nation’s retreat from
surveillance, Secretary of War Henry Stimson closed the Military
Intelligence cipher section in 1929, saying famously, “Gentlemen do not
read each other’s mail.”
After retiring at the rank of major general that same year, Van Deman
and his wife continued from their home in San Diego to coordinate an
informal intelligence exchange system, compiling files on 250,000
suspected “subversives.” They also took reports from classified
government files and slipped them to citizen anti-communist groups for
blacklisting. In the 1950 elections, for instance, Representative
Richard Nixon reportedly used Van Deman’s files to circulate “pink
sheets” at rallies denouncing California Congresswoman Helen Gahagan
Douglas, his opponent in a campaign for a Senate seat, launching a
victorious Nixon on the path to the presidency.
From retirement, Van Deman, in league with FBI Director J. Edgar
Hoover, also proved crucial at a 1940 closed-door conference that
awarded the FBI control over domestic counterintelligence. The Army’s
Military Intelligence, and its successors, the CIA and NSA, were
restricted to foreign espionage, a division of tasks that would hold, at
least
in principle,
until the post-9/11 years. So armed, during World War II the FBI used
warrantless wiretaps, “black bag” break-ins, and surreptitious mail
opening to track suspects, while mobilizing more than 300,000 informers
to secure defense plants against wartime threats that ultimately proved
“negligible.”
The Vietnam Years
In response to the civil rights and anti-Vietnam protests of the
1960s, the FBI deployed its COINTELPRO operation, using what Senator
Frank Church’s famous investigative committee later called “unsavory and
vicious tactics… including anonymous attempts to break up marriages,
disrupt meetings, ostracize persons from their professions, and provoke
target groups into rivalries that might result in deaths.”
In assessing COINTELPRO’s 2,370 actions from 1960 to 1974, the Church
Committee branded them a “sophisticated vigilante operation” that
“would be intolerable in a democratic society even if all of the targets
had been involved in violent activity.” Significantly, even this
aggressive Senate investigation did not probe Director Hoover’s
notorious “private files” on the peccadilloes of leading politicians
that had insulated his Bureau from any oversight for more than 30 years.
After New York Times reporter
Seymour Hersh exposed
illegal CIA surveillance of American antiwar activists in 1974, Senator
Church’s committee and a presidential commission under Nelson
Rockefeller investigated the Agency’s “Operation Chaos,” a program to
conduct massive illegal surveillance of the antiwar protest movement,
discovering a database with 300,000 names. These investigations also
exposed the excesses of the FBI’s COINTELPRO, forcing the Bureau to
reform.
To prevent future abuses, President Jimmy Carter signed the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in 1978, creating a special court
to approve all national security wiretaps. In a bitter irony, Carter’s
supposed reform ended up plunging the judiciary into the secret world of
the surveillance managers where, after 9/11, it
became a rubberstamp institution for every kind of state intrusion on domestic privacy.
How the Global War on Terror Came Home
As its pacification wars in Afghanistan and Iraq sank into bloody
quagmires, Washington brought electronic surveillance, biometric
identification, and unmanned aerial vehicles to the battlefields. This
trio, which failed to decisively turn the tide in those lands,
nonetheless now undergirds a global U.S. surveillance apparatus of
unequalled scope and unprecedented power.
After confining the populations of Baghdad and the rebellious Sunni
city of Falluja behind blast-wall cordons, the U.S. Army attempted to
bring the Iraqi resistance under control in part by
collecting, as of 2011, three million Iraqi fingerprints,iris, and retinal scans. These were
deposited in
a biometric database in West Virginia that American soldiers at
checkpoints and elsewhere on distant battlefields could at any moment
access by satellite link. Simultaneously, the Joint Special Operations
Command under General Stanley McChrystal
centralized all electronic and satellite surveillance in the Greater Middle East to identify possible al-Qaeda operatives for
assassination by Predator drones or hunter-killer raids by Special Operations commandos from Somalia to Pakistan.
Domestically, post-9/11, the White House tried to create a modern
version of the old state-citizen alliance for domestic surveillance. In
May 2002, President Bush’s Justice Department
launched Operation
TIPS with “millions of American truckers, letter carriers, train
conductors, ship captains, utility employees, and others” spying
on fellow citizens. But there was vocal opposition from members of
Congress, civil libertarians, and the media, which soon forced Justice
to quietly kill the program.
In a digital iteration of the same effort, retired admiral John Poindexter began to
set up an
ominously titled Pentagon program called Total Information Awareness to
amass a “detailed electronic dossier on millions of Americans.” Again
the nation recoiled, Congress banned the program, and the admiral was
forced to resign.
Defeated in the public arena, the Bush administration retreated into
the shadows, where it launched secret FBI and NSA domestic surveillance
programs. Here, Congress proved far more amenable and pliable. In 2002,
Congress
erased the
bright line that had long barred the CIA from domestic spying, granting
the agency the power to access U.S. financial records and audit
electronic communications routed through the country.
Defying the FISA law, in October 2001 President Bush
ordered the
NSA to commence covert monitoring of private communications through the
nation’s telephone companies without the requisite warrants.
According to the
Associated Press, he also “secretly authorized the NSA to plug into the
fiber optic cables that enter and leave the United States” carrying the
world’s “emails, telephone calls, video chats, websites, bank
transactions, and more.” Since his administration had already
conveniently decided that
“metadata was not constitutionally protected,” the NSA began an
open-ended program, Operation Stellar Wind, “to collect bulk telephony
and Internet metadata.”
By 2004, the Bush White House was so wedded to Internet metadata
collection that top aides barged into Attorney General John Ashcroft’s
hospital room to extract a reauthorization signature for the program.
They were
blocked by
Justice Department officials led by Deputy Attorney General James
Comey, forcing a two-month suspension until that FISA court, brought
into existence in the Carter years, put its first rubber-stamp on this
mass surveillance regime.
Armed with expansive FISA court orders allowing the collection of
data sets rather than information from specific targets, the FBI’s “
Investigative Data Warehouse” acquired
more than a billion documents within
five years, including intelligence reports, social security files,
drivers’ licenses, and private financial information. All of this was
accessible to 13,000 analysts making a million queries monthly. In 2006,
as the flood of data surging through fiber optic cables strained NSA
computers, the Bush administration
launched the
Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity to develop
supercomputing searches powerful enough to process this torrent of
Internet information.
In 2005, a New York Times investigative report
exposed the administration’s illegal surveillance for the first time. A year later, USA Today
reported that
the NSA was “secretly collecting the phone call records of tens of
millions of Americans, using data provided by AT&T, Verizon, and
Bell South.” One expert called it “the largest database ever assembled
in the world,” adding presciently that the Agency’s goal was “to create a
database of every call ever made.”
In August 2007, in response to these revelations, Congress
capitulated. It passed a new law, the Protect America Act, which
retrospectively legalized this illegal White House-inspired set of
programs by requiring greater oversight by the FISA court. This secret
tribunal — acting almost as a “
parallel Supreme Court”
that rules on fundamental constitutional rights without adversarial
proceedings or higher review — has removed any real restraint on the
National Security Agency’s bulk collection of Internet metadata and
regularly rubberstamps almost
100% of the government’s thousands of surveillance requests. Armed with
expanded powers, the National Security Agency promptly
launched its
PRISM program (recently revealed by Edward Snowden). To feed its
hungry search engines, the NSA has compelled nine Internet giants,
including Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, AOL, and Skype, to
transfer what became billions of emails to its massive data farms.
Obama’s Expanding Surveillance Universe
Instead of curtailing his predecessor’s wartime surveillance, as
Republicans did in the 1920s and Democrats in the 1970s, President Obama
has overseen the expansion of the NSA’s wartime digital operations into
a permanent weapon for the exercise of U.S. global power.
The Obama administration continued a Bush-era NSA program of “bulk email records collection” until 2011 when two senators
protested that
the agency’s “statements to both Congress and the Court… significantly
exaggerated this program’s effectiveness.” Eventually, the
administration was forced to curtail this particular operation.
Nonetheless, the NSA has continued to
collect the personal communications of Americans by the billions under its
PRISM and other programs.
In the Obama years as well, the NSA began cooperating with its
long-time British counterpart, the Government Communications
Headquarters (GCHQ), to
tap into the
dense cluster of Trans-Atlantic Telecommunication fiber optic cables
that transit the United Kingdom. During a visit to a GCHQ facility for
high-altitude intercepts at Menwith Hill in June 2008, NSA Director
General Keith Alexander asked, “Why can’t we collect all the signals all
the time? Sounds like a good summer project for Menwith.”
In the process, GCHQ’s Operation Tempora
achieved the
“biggest Internet access” of any partner in a “Five Eyes”
signals-intercept coalition that, in addition to Great Britain and the
U.S., includes Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. When the project went
online in 2011, the GCHQ sank probes into 200 Internet cables and was
soon collecting 600 million telephone messages daily, which were, in
turn, made accessible to 850,000 NSA employees.
The historic alliance between the NSA and GCHQ
dates back to
the dawn of the Cold War. In deference to it, the NSA has, since 2007,
exempted its “2nd party” Five Eyes allies from surveillance under its
“Boundless Informant” operation. According to another
recently leaked NSA
document, however, “we can, and often do, target the signals of most
3rd party foreign partners.” This is clearly a reference to close
allies like Germany, France, and Italy.
On a busy day in January 2013, for instance, the NSA
collected 60
million phone calls and emails from Germany — some 500 million German
messages are reportedly collected annually — with lesser but still hefty
numbers from France, Italy, and non-European allies like
Brazil. To gain operational intelligence on such allies, the NSA
taps phones at
the European Council headquarters in Brussels, bugs the European Union
(EU) delegation at the U.N., has planted a “Dropmire” monitor “on the
Cryptofax at the EU embassy DC,” and eavesdrops on 38 allied embassies
worldwide.
Such secret intelligence about its allies gives Washington an immense diplomatic advantage,
says NSA
expert James Bamford. “It’s the equivalent of going to a poker game and
wanting to know what everyone’s hand is before you place your bet.” And
who knows what scurrilous bits of scandal about world leaders American
surveillance systems might scoop up to strengthen Washington’s hand in
that global poker game called diplomacy.
This sort of digital surveillance was soon supplemented by actual Internet warfare. Between 2006 and 2010, Washington launched
the planet’s first cyberwar, with Obama
ordering devastating cyberattacks against Iran’s nuclear facilities. In 2009, the Pentagon
formed the U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), with a cybercombat center at Lackland Air Base initially
staffed by 7,000 Air Force employees. Over the next two years, by
appointingNSA
chief Alexander as CYBERCOM’s concurrent commander, it created an
enormous concentration of power in the digital shadows. The Pentagon
has also
declared cyberspace an “operational domain” for both offensive and defensive warfare.
Controlling the Future
By leaking a handful of NSA documents, Edward Snowden has given us a
glimpse of future U.S. global policy and the changing architecture of
power on this planet. At the broadest level, this digital shift
complements Obama’s new defense strategy, announced in 2012, of
reducing costs (cutting, for example, infantry troops by 14%), while conserving Washington’s overall power by developing a
capacity for “a combined arms campaign across all domains — land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace.”
While cutting conventional armaments, Obama is investing billions in
constructing a new architecture for global information control. To store
and process the billions of messages sucked up by its worldwide
surveillance network (
totaling 97 billion items for March alone), the NSA is
employing11,000 workers to build a $1.6 billion data center in Bluffdale, Utah, whose
storage capacity is
measured in “yottabytes,” each the equivalent of a trillion terabytes.
That’s almost unimaginable once you realize that just 15 terabytes
could store every publication in the Library of Congress.
From its new $1.8 billion headquarters, the third-biggest building in
the Washington area, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
deploys 16,000
employees and a $5 billion budget to coordinate a rising torrent of
surveillance data from Predators, Reapers, U-2 spy planes, Global Hawks,
X-37B space drones, Google Earth, Space Surveillance Telescopes, and
orbiting satellites.
To protect those critical orbiting satellites, which transmit most
U.S. military communications, the Pentagon is building an aerospace
shield of pilotless drones. In the exosphere, the Air Force has since
April 2010 been
successfully testing the X-37B space drone that can
carry missiles to strike rival satellite networks such as the one the Chinese are currently creating.
For more extensive and precise surveillance from space, the Pentagon has been
replacing its costly, school-bus-sized spy satellites with a new generation of light, low cost models such as the
ATK-A200.
Successfully launched in May 2011, this module is orbiting 250 miles
above the Earth with remote-controlled, U-2 quality cameras that now
provide the “U.S. Central Command an assured ISR (Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) capability.”
In the stratosphere, close enough to Earth for audiovisual surveillance, the Pentagon is planning to
launch an
armada of 99 Global Hawk drones — each equipped with high-resolution
cameras to surveil all terrain within a 100-mile radius, electronic
sensors to intercept communications, and efficient engines for
continuous 24-hour flight.
Within a decade, the U.S. will likely deploy this aerospace shield,
advanced cyberwarfare capabilities, and even vaster, more omnipresent
digital surveillance networks that will envelop the Earth in an
electronic grid capable of blinding entire armies on the battlefield,
atomizing a single suspected terrorist, or monitoring millions of
private lives at home and abroad.
Sadly, Mark Twain was right when he warned us just over 100 years ago
that America could not have both empire abroad and democracy at home.
To paraphrase his prescient words, by “trampling upon the helpless
abroad” with unchecked surveillance, Americans have learned, “by a
natural process, to endure with apathy the like at home.”
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